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Veiled Women in the American Courtroom: Is the Niqab a Barrier to 
Justice? 
Anita L. Allen 
The United States is home to millions of Muslims.1 American Muslims are 
“largely assimilated, happy with their lives, and moderate with respect to many of the 
issues that have divided Muslims and Westerners around the world.”2 Experts disagree 
about whether the number of U.S. Muslims is closer to two million than to eight million, 
but no one doubts that Islam is now among the most practiced religions in the country. 
Like their Christians, Jewish, Buddhist and Hindu counterparts, many Muslims are 
devoutly religious. Michigan has more Muslims than any other U.S. state; in 2005 the 
Islamic Center of America, the largest of more than twelve hundred U.S. mosques, 
opened in Dearborn, Michigan. The ethnic and national origins of U.S. Muslims are 
diverse. Some of the millions of U.S. families who practice Islam are recent immigrants 
from Africa, the Middle East, Europe or Asia. Michigan has one of the highest 
concentrations of Muslims of Arab ancestry outside of the Arab world. However, about a 
third of U.S. Muslims are long-time U.S. residents and citizens.3 Of these, some were 
born into families who practice Islam, others converted to Islam as children or adults. 
                                                 
1 "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream," in Pew Research Center [database online]. 
Available from http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf (last visited June 2, 2010). Pew 
describes its report as the “first ever nationwide survey to attempt to measure rigorously the demographics, 
attitudes and experiences of Muslim Americans.” (p. 3).  
2 Id. at 7.  
3 The Pew Research Center Report estimates the number of US. Muslims to be 2.35 million and states that 
“Roughly two-thirds (65%) of adult Muslims in the U.S. were born elsewhere,” and “Among native-born 
Muslims, roughly half are African American (20% of U.S. Muslims overall), many of whom are converts 
to Islam.” Other estimates of the proportion of African Americans that comprise the Muslim population 
range from 40% to 85%. African Americans are considered the largest group of nonimmigrant Muslims in 
the United States. Karan Fraser Wyche, “African American Muslim Women: an Invisible Group,” Sex 
Roles 51 (September 2004): 319-328.   
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Among the indigenous U.S. Muslim population groups are African American adherents, 
and most Black Muslim women adopt Islamic dress.4  
While most American Muslims dress in standard “western” secular clothing, 
some U.S. women who practice Islam dress modestly. A number wear hijab headscarves 
in everyday life, and keep their arms and legs covered. A few wear the niqab. The niqab 
is a garment worn outside the home or in the presence of unrelated men that cloaks a 
woman’s head and neck, leaving only her eyes exposed. A very few US Muslim women 
don the burqa. The burqa is a full body mantle worn outside the home, cloaking the 
woman’s entire body and face. Although American women who visit Muslim counties -- 
including Secretary of State and former First Lady Hilary Clinton and Congresswoman 
and Nancy Pelosi, have donned modesty headscarves to show respect, not everyone in the 
U.S. accepts the sight of partly or fully “veiled” women. For many U.S. non-Muslims and 
many U.S. Muslims, too, face covering symbolizes female oppression and subservience, 
religious extremism and radical politics. Many women who wear headscarves report that 
they have experienced anti-Muslim discrimination, have been prohibited from wearing 
the veil in schools, and have even endured violent attacks.5 Professor of Islamic Studies 
Aminah McCloud argues that African American women who wear the hijab attract more 
hostility than Muslim immigrants because although many non-Muslim Americans may 
                                                 
4 Converts to Islam in the U.S. are “among the most enthusiastic about wearing traditional women’s attire.” 
Donna Gehrke-White, The Face Behind the Veil: the Extraordinary Lives of Muslims Women in America 
(New York: Kensington Publication, 2006) 2-5. See also, Yvonne Yazbeck Hadda, Jane I. Smith & 
Kathleen M. Moore, Muslim Women in America (New York: Oxford, 2006) 45 (“Most Muslim women 
who are black choose to adopt Islamic dress and Islamic names…”). As an aside, it has also been 
documented that African American women are known for their creativity in designing stylish garments that 
also attend to the modesty requirement. Id. at 13.  
5 Yazbeck, Muslim Women in America at 103-107.  
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accept that immigrants dress differently, they may find it difficult to accept locals who 
wear headscarves.6  
Governments around the world have banned or placed restrictions on wearing the 
burqa, niqab, and hijab.7 In 2009, Belgium banned the burqa and niqab from its public 
streets, incurring the price of immediate criticism.8 On the premise that Muslim modesty 
attire hinders communication or visual identification, in 2010, the Canadian province of 
Quebec introduced a bill requiring the removal of the niqab when seeking medical and 
other benefits or services from government.9 A year earlier, however, in a criminal case 
brought against Muslim men accused of raping a Muslim woman when she was a child, 
an Ontario court found that a judge could not deny the victim an opportunity to testify in 
court wearing her niqab, without first conducting a preliminary hearing to determine 
whether her professed religious beliefs and practices were sincere and deeply held.10 In 
2004, the French government banned the hijab from public schools.11 More recently, the 
Senate approved by a great majority (246 to 1) a bill to ban full facial veiling from all 
                                                 
6 Id. at 59-60 (taken from Aminah McCloud, African American Islam (New York: Routledge, 1995).  
7 I also address this question in Anita L. Allen, "Undressing Difference: The Hijab in the West," Berkeley 
Journal of Gender, Law and Justice 23 (2008): 208-224.  
8 Yassin Musharbash, "It Makes No Sense to Ban the Burqa," in Spiegel Online [database online]. 
Available from http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,687105,00.html (Last visited June 2, 
2010); Reuters, “Muslim Woman in Italy Is Fined for Wearing Veil,” New York Times, 5 May 2010, A12 
(reporting that “a 26-year-old Tunisian woman has been fined for wearing a face veil while walking to a 
mosque in northern Italy.”).  
9 Bill 94: An Act to establish guidelines governing accommodation requests within the Administration and 
certain institutions, available from http://www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/projets-loi/projet-loi-
94-39-1.html (last visited June 2, 2010).  
See also, Ian Austen, “Canada: Bill in Quebec Would Ban Veils in Dealings with Officials,” New York 
Times, 25 March 2010, A15.  
10 R. v. S. (N.) (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 2268, 95 O.R. (3d) 735 (Ont. S.C.J.).  
11 Recently, an Israeli court held that private Catholic school can ban Muslim teacher from wearing the 
Hijab. Dan Izenberg, “Court: Private School Can Bar Teacher from Wearing Hijab,” the Jerusalem Post, 5 
September 2010. Available from:  http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=187073     
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public places.12 However, because the Council of State has warned that banning the veil 
from public places violates the French Constitution and the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the bill still risks being declared 
unconstitutional.13  
Debates around the niqab also preoccupy courts and the public in Muslim 
countries. In 2010, the Cairo administrative Court upheld a ban on the niqab in university 
examination rooms.14 But in 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court of Egypt found on 
religious freedom grounds that the American University of Cairo could not ban the niqab 
from campus. It was permitted, though, to require brief unveiling for verification of 
identity.15 Turkey banned the hijab, niqab and burqa from its universities entirely, then 
took an about face on the niqab for a time, after the more comprehensive ban, which had 
been upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in 2004,16 led some girls to choose 
                                                 
12 Elaine Ganley, “French Senate Passes Ban on Full Muslim Veils,” The Washington Times, 14 September 
2010. Available from: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/14/french-senate-passes-ban-full-
muslim-veils/  
13 Lizzy Davies, “Nicolas Sarkozy’s Cabinet Approves Bill to Ban Full Islamic Veil,” the Guardian, 20 
May 2010, 23. Recent veiling legislation in Spain almost followed the French example. In 2010, the Senate 
approved a ban against wearing the burqa in all public places. This bill was later rejected by a slim 
majority in the Parliament. However, the government announced it will introduce a different version of the 
bill later. Raphael Minder, “Spain’s Senate Votes to Ban Burqa,” New York Times, 23 June 2010. 
Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/24/world/europe/24iht-spain.html?ref=muslim_veiling 
(last visited July 18 2010). See also, Alan Clendenning & Harold Heckle, Spain Rejects Burqa Ban – For 
Now in The Huffington Post [database online]. Available from: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/20/spain-rejects-burqa-ban_n_653254.html (last visited July 20 
2010).   
14 Jaclyn Belczyk, “Egypt Court Upholds Niqab Ban for University Examinations” in Jurist [database 
online]. Available from: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2010/01/egypt-court-uphold-niqab-ban-
for.php (last visited June 3 2010).  
15 Id.  
16 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H. R. (Application No. 44774/98, Nov. 10, 2005). The European Court 
of Human Rights heard the case of a Turkish university student woman who had objected to a ban on the 
hijab in schools, a policy the Turkish Parliament reconsidered in 2008 because it was effectively excluding 
non-secular women from getting a university education at all. Today headscarves that cover the neck, the 
chador and the burqa are banned on campus; but traditional scarves tied under the chin are allowed. The 
European Court of Human Rights heard another case regarding the veil in Dahlab v. Switzerland (2001) V 
Eur Court HR 449.  Here, a schoolteacher was banned from teaching in a primary school because she wore 
an “Islamic headscarf,” but the case was dismissed as inadmissible. For a critique of these two court cases, 
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piety over education. When the Turkish Parliament reinstated the hijab ban, some 
university students took to covering their hijab-hooded hair with wigs.17 Recently, Syria 
prohibited the wearing of niqab (but not the hijab) in its universities.18  
In the U.S., there have been no sustained calls for local, state or federal 
government to ban the hijab, niqab or burqa from public places or schools. In fact, in 
contrast to the overwhelming majority of Europeans that support a ban against wearing 
the niqab, sixty five percent of Americans say they would oppose such a ban.19 I argue 
that a ban against wearing Islamic garments in the U.S. would clearly cross into a zone of 
constitutionally protected freedom of religion and personal liberty. The First Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution protects freedom of religious belief and exercise: “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.” Yet in the context of court appearances, court detention, drivers’ license 
issuance and air travel, U.S. policymakers and courts have authorized laws and practices 
that interfere with Muslim women’s free exercise of their religion, namely, the wearing 
of modesty attire that conceals the hair or face from view.  
Does government have a right to demand that women take off their modesty 
clothing? The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that when a woman facing a 
                                                                                                                                                 
see Carolyn Evans, “The ‘Islamic Scarf’ in the European Court of Human Rights,” Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 7 (2006): 52-74. (Evans criticizes the Court’s reliance on stereotypes about Muslim 
women).  
17 Matt Porter, “Headscarves in Turkey Wave a Red Fleg” in Global Post [database online]. Available from: 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/study-abroad/100209/headscarves-turkey (last visited June 3 2010).  
18 The Associate Press, Syria: Islamic Scarf That Leaves Only Eyes Exposed Is Banned, New York Times, 
19 July 2010, A9. 
19 Pew Research Center, “Widespread Support for Banning Full Islamic Veil in Western Europe, Most 
Americans Disapprove” in Pew Research Publication Center Publications [database online]. Available 
from: http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1658/widespread-support-for-banning-full-islamic-veil-western-europe-
not-in-america (last visited July 20 2010).    
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parole violation charge for a misdemeanor offense is detained in a courthouse holding 
cell she can be required to remove her hijab for security reasons.20 A noteworthy, bell-
weather development because Michigan has the largest population of Muslims in the 
country, a recently adopted Michigan law allows judges to order Muslim women not 
charged with any crime to bare their faces in court or go home. Courtroom controls over 
attire are clearly warranted and necessary for the sake of security, order and decorum. Yet 
banning from the courtroom the niqab head-covering of a sincere, practicing Muslim 
woman of whose identity the court is certain, is intolerant and risks running afoul of the 
First Amendment principle of religious free exercise and other federal laws.  
The Michigan Niqab Case 
 Michigan District Judge Paul Paruk dismissed Ginnah Muhammad’s lawsuit 
against a car rental company when she refused to unveil.21 The rental company was 
seeking $3,000 to cover repairs on an automobile leased to Muhammad, an African 
American Muslim. Muhammad said the car had been damaged by thieves. Although she 
wanted access to small claims court to litigate her claim, Muhammad did not wish to 
show her full face. She wanted to wear her niqab, as she did in daily life. Because she 
refused to uncover her full face in his courtroom, Judge Paruk dismissed Muhammad’s 
case. The Michigan District Judges Association sided with Judge Paruk’s decision to oust 
Muhammad. Civil liberties groups sided with Muhammad who believed, with many other 
devout Muslims, that the holy Quran, requires women to cover their bodies in the 
presence of men outside their families. While many practicing Muslims in the U.S. do not 
                                                 
20 Khatib v. County of Orange, 603 F. 3d 713 (9th Cir.  May 3, 2010). 
21 Muhammad v. Paruk, 553 F.Supp.2d 893 (E.D.Mich.2008).  
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wear modesty attire, for those who do, the practice is central to their faith.  When a judge 
demands that an otherwise orderly person with a valid legal claim remove religious attire 
or face dismissal of her suit, the judge unfairly and unreasonably burdens her right of 
religious free exercise.  
 The Supreme Court of Michigan appears to have sided with Judge Paruk. On 
June 17, 2009, by a vote of 5 to 2, the Supreme Court of Michigan adopted an 
amendment to Michigan Rule of Evidence 611.22  The new rule, Michigan Rule of 
Evidence 611(b), provides that: “The court shall exercise reasonable control over the 
appearance of parties and witnesses so as to (1) ensure that the demeanor of such persons 
may be observed and assessed by the fact-finder, and (2) to ensure the accurate 
identification of such persons.” This amendment would presumably allow a judge to ask 
a party or witness entering the courtroom wearing a ski-mask, nylon stocking stretched 
over his head or a Ku Klux Klan hood to remove it for the duration of the proceeding. 
Yet Michigan Rule 611(b) was not adopted in response to ski masks, stockings or Klan 
hoods. It was adopted to provide positive legal authority for Michigan judges (like Judge 
Paruk), to order a woman wearing the niqab (like Ginnah Muhammad) to uncover her 
face or leave the courtroom. The niqab has been understandably reviled as a symbol of 
women’s political oppression and subservience; but coercing a woman to remove an 
emblem of religious piety raises a specter of political oppression of another kind.   
Other U.S. states have laws giving judges authority to control attire. Oregon has 
such a law, Uniform Trial Court Rule 3.010(1), authorizing exclusion of persons attired 
                                                 
22 Amendment of Rule 611 of the Michigan Rules of Evidence, available from: 
http://courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Resources/Administrative/2007-13-08-25-09-Order.pdf (last 
visited June 3 2010).    
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in ways that detract “from the dignity of the court.” Yet an Oregon woman successfully 
appealed her theft conviction on the ground that the judge refused to allow a defense 
witnesses to testify when he declined to remove what the appeals court termed his 
“religious headgear” in the courtroom.23 The witness in question was the woman’s 
husband, whom an appeals court held the presiding judge improperly excluded under a 
misapplication of Rule 3.010(1). This obscure Oregon case brings to mind Gandhi’s 
historic encounter with a South African judge. Upon swearing the nation’s first “colored” 
bar member in a highly publicized and long-awaited ceremony, the judge asked Gandhi 
to remove his turban, presumably out of deference to the court. Gandhi reluctantly caved 
in, believing he had bigger battles to fight. But most Americans who wear religious attire 
in everyday life, are more like the Oregon man than like Gandhi: they have no bigger 
battles in view to salve their wounded dignity in the present.24  
The niqab is an unusual garment in the U.S., but it is worn by U.S. women of varied 
ethnicities who practice Islam. While uncommon, Muslim modesty dress has led to 
publicized and litigated conflicts between Muslim women and public authorities. A 
Florida woman clashed with the Florida motor vehicle authority.25 Sultaana Freeman 
argued that state officials violated the Florida Constitution and the Florida Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (FRFRA) when they revoked her driver's license because she 
refused to be photographed without her niqab. The FRFRA provides that “Government 
shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results 
                                                 
23 State v. Allen, 113 Ore. App. 306, 308 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). 
24 Mohandas K. Gandhi, Gandhi An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments With Truth, trans. 
Mahadev Desai (New York: Beacon Press, 1993). 
25 Freeman v. State, 2003 WL 21338619 (Fla.Cir.Ct. Jun 06, 2003) (NO. 2002-CA-2828). Affirmed by 
Freeman v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 924 So.2d 48, 31 Fla. L. Weekly 
D537 (Fla.App. 5 Dist. Feb 13, 2006) (NO. 5D03-2296), rehearing denied (Mar 29, 2006).   
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from a rule of general applicability,” unless Government demonstrates that application of 
the burden to the person— (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.”26 Under FRFRA, Florida was required to show that it had a compelling interest 
in photographing drivers and that denying Freeman a license altogether was the “least 
restrictive” means of furthering its interest. Freeman’s lawsuit, filed on her behalf by the 
ACLU of Florida, cited Colorado, Indiana and Nebraska cases in which courts had ruled 
that individuals with sincerely held religious beliefs are entitled to licenses without 
photographs.27 Those cases involved members of Christian sects who interpret the Bible’s 
“Second Commandment” against graven images to prohibit them from having their 
pictures taken. ACLU attorney Howard Marks, who argued Freeman’s case before Ninth 
Judicial Circuit Court suggested that the state was using her as a scapegoat in the “war 
                                                 
26 A federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, was found unconstitutional 
as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997).  The passage of federal RFRA was a response by 
Congress to  Supreme Court Free exercise decisions including  Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990).  Prior to RFRA, the Court had held that minority religions are not relieved from the force of 
laws of general application, such as the nation’s polygamy and controlled substance laws.  The 
Employment Division case upheld the denial of unemployment benefits to two Native American men who 
lost their state jobs because they had consumed sacramental peyote as part of a Native American church 
ritual. Florida has adopted its own version RFRA that mirrors the federal statute, as follows: 
 Fla. Stat. Ann. §§761.01-761.05 (1998) 
761.01 Short title.#&151; This act may be cited as the "Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998."  
761.02 Definitions.#&151;—As used in this act:  
(1) "Government" or "state" includes any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official or other 
person acting under color of law of the state, a county, special district, municipality, or any other 
subdivision of the state.  
(2) "Demonstrates" means to meet the burden of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion.  
(3) "Exercise of religion" means an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by a religious belief, 
whether or not the religious exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of religious belief.  
761.03 Free exercise of religion protected. #&151;  
(1) The government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results 
from a rule of general applicability, except that government may substantially burden a person's exercise of 
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person:  
   (a) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and  
   (b) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.  
(2) A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that 
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief. … 
27 Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir.1984); Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of 
Prayer, Inc., 269 Ind. 361, 380 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind.1978); Dennis v. Charnes, 805 F.2d 339 (10th Cir.1984). 
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against terror,” when all she wanted to do was to be able to “drive her kids to the doctor 
or go grocery shopping.”28 Following the litigation Florida amended the law to exempt 
the requirement of full face photo from FRFRA.29   
 A devout Pennsylvania woman clashed with officials at the State Correctional 
Institution at Graterford, Pennsylvania, who refused to allow her to visit her imprisoned 
son unless she agreed to remove her veil.30 The woman brought a lawsuit in federal court 
to enjoin the prison to allow visitation while veiled. The judge who heard her case 
determined that “requiring the plaintiff to remove her veil as a condition of her right to 
visit her son in prison constitutes substantially burdening her exercise of religion.”31 
Pennsylvania, like Florida has a Religious Freedom Restoration Act statute.32 The judge’s 
constitutional analysis in the Graterford prison case conformed to a model Congress and 
several states courts have established for thinking about what it means to respect the 
fundamental right to practice one’s religion. This model indicates that government may 
not interfere with persons’ free exercise of rights other than to further its compelling, that 
is, urgent and important, interests. When the government’s compelling interests require 
burdens on religious free exercise, as they will from time to time, those burdens should 
be minimized. In considering means to further its compelling interests, the government 
must select practical means that are the least restrictive of religious freedom.  
                                                 
28 John-Thor Dahlburg, “Court Battle Over Veil Pits Religion Against Security,” Los Angeles Times, 30 
May 2003, available from: http://articles.latimes.com/2003/may/30/nation/na-veil30 (last visited 10 June 
2010).   
29 Section 332.051 reads as follow: “Notwithstanding chapter 761 or s. 761.05, the requirement for a 
fullface photograph or digital image of the identification card holder may not be waived.”  
30 Bint-Ishmawiyl v. Vaughn, 1995 WL 461949 (E.D. Pa. 1995).  
31 Ibid.  
32 71 Pa. Stat. §2401-2407 (2002). 
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Although the state has a “compelling interest in making sure that visitors to 
inmates are indeed the persons they profess to be” the burdens placed on the veiled 
woman must be the “least restrictive.”33 Rather than excluding the veiled mother from 
visits, the court found that the prison should inform her of the visitation times and dates 
when female corrections officers are on duty, so that she can briefly unveil to establish 
her identity prior to contact with her son.  
Without anticipatory safeguards in place directing officials to accommodate 
religious attire as required by law, a woman’s unwillingness to remove the niqab can 
have dire consequences. The consequence can be denial of access to an incarcerated 
family member, illustrated by the Pennsylvania Graterford prison case; or denial of 
access to civil court, illustrated by the Michigan case. To toss out Muhammed’s lawsuit 
because she wore the niqab, rather than to seek to accommodate her faith and lawsuit, 
was to ignore the demands of deference to religion. 
It could be argued that since Michigan Rule 611(b) permits judicial discretion 
without requiring a judge to order the removal of Muslim modesty attire, it is lawful. 
Ideally a judge would not use his or her “reasonable control” authority to exclude 
religious attire unless first determining that exclusion was necessary to further a 
compelling state interest. However the amendment was adopted in the context of a 
dispute over the niqab, precisely to authorize an interference with religious free exercise. 
Given the rule’s genesis and doubtful constitutionality, it is not surprising that the 
Michigan Supreme Court decision to adopt it was not unanimous. Two judges, Chief 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
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Justice Marilyn Kelly and Justice Diane Hathaway dissented from the decision to amend 
the state’s evidentiary rules.  
Reasonable Control of the Courtroom 
The Michigan Supreme Court sought to give judges the right to exercise 
“reasonable control.”34 It is hard to argue against a judicial power labeled “reasonable 
control.” In the past American judges have sometimes failed to exercise “reasonable” 
control over states of dress and undress in their courtrooms. An extreme instance from 
the past, the New York judge who tried the infamous Rhinelander v. Rhinelander 
marriage dissolution case allowed the plaintiff wife to undress in front of a jury, 
putatively to buttress the claim that her wealthy white husband was not a victim of 
fraud.35 Intimate letters revealed that Mr. Kip Rhinelander had seen Mrs. Alice 
Rhinelander nude in sexual encounters before marriage and that he had to have known 
that she was “colored” when he married her—there was no fraudulent pretense of 
whiteness.36   
More recently, judges have demanded that an African American attorney remove 
an African fabric kente cloth he said was required by his role as an officer of his church,37 
                                                 
34 Amendment of Rule 611 of the Michigan Rules of Evidence, available from: 
http://courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Resources/Administrative/2007-13-08-25-09-Order.pdf (last 
visited June 3 2010).    
35 Rhinelander v. Rhinelander, 219 N.Y.S. 548 (N.Y. App. Div. 1927), aff'd 157 N.E. 838 (N.Y. 1927). 
36 Earl Lewis & Heidi Ardizonne, Love on Trial: an American Scandal in Black and White  (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2001).   
37  Anita Womack, “Judge Tells Lawyer not to Wear Kente Cloth in Court” Times Daily, 23 May 1992, 
available from:  
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1842&dat=19920523&id=iUweAAAAIBAJ&sjid=MscEAAAAI
BAJ&pg=1385,3508784 (last visited June 3 2010).  
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that a Jewish man remove his yarmulke skull cap,38 and that a Roman Catholic priest 
serving as an attorney in a criminal matter appear in court in non-clerical garb to insure a 
fair trial.39 One judge erroneously ordered a new trial because a witness who was a 
Roman Catholic priest testified in a personal injury case wearing his clerical collar.40  It is 
important to consider what kind of control over attire worn for religious purposes is truly 
reasonable, and specifically whether a society citing compelling state interests may justly 
restrict the wearing of face–coverings that are commended by religion.  
In a 1991 Memorandum addressed to his state’s judges, New Jersey Chief Justice 
Robert N Wilentz directed judges he supervised not to restrict litigants or witnesses from 
dressing as they choose: “I do not believe we should try to influence how litigants or 
witnesses dress, absent something that approaches the obscene.”41 (Muslim modesty 
attire is, by U.S. standards, virtually the opposite of obscene since it conceals breasts, sex 
organs and then some.) Furthermore, Justice Wilenz wrote, “I believe the fact finder, 
albeit the jury or the judge, should see the litigant or witness as the person wishes to 
appear and reach whatever conclusions flow from that ‘fact.’”42 Many jurists would find 
Wilenz’s anything-short-of-obscenity standard, too permissive. But the U.S. and England 
share a legal heritage and a recent UK study calls for an open mind and case-by-case 
pragmatism in responding to religious attire.  
                                                 
38 Close-It Enters., Inc. v. Mayer Weinberger, 64 A.D.2d 686, 407 N.Y.S.2d 587 (2d Dept.1978).  
39 La Rocca v. Lane, 77 Misc.2d 123, 353 N.Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y.Sup. Mar 11, 1974), reversed on other 
grounds in La Rocca v. Lane, 47 A.D.2d 243, 366 N.Y.S.2d 456 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. Apr 07, 1975).  
40 Ryslik v. Krass, 652 A.2d 767 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). 
41 Ryslik, 652 A.2d at 770. 
42 Ryslik, 652 A.2d at 770.  
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Indeed the Equal Treatment Advisory Committee of the United Kingdom’s 
Judicial Studies Board urged tolerance, sensitivity and pragmatism in its 2007 guidelines 
for managing religious attire worn by parties, witnesses, judges, jurors, lawyers and 
incidental courtroom staff: “There is room for diversity, and there should be willingness 
to accommodate different practices and approaches to religious and cultural 
observance.”43 The Board found that while sensitive, well-explained requests that a 
woman remove her niqab will sometimes be warranted by the facts and circumstances at 
hand, “it is often possible,” the Board concluded, “to assess the evidence of a woman 
wearing a niqab.” Judges sometime take evidence over the telephone and some judges are 
sight-impaired, hence the judiciary may not consistently presume that “the veil represents 
a true obstacle to the judicial task.”44 In sum, “In many cases, there will be no need for a 
woman to remove her niqab, provided that the judge is of the view that justice can be 
properly served.”45 A recent case in England provides an example of the way sensitivity 
and consideration can resolve more complicated situations. In this case, a fully veiled 
woman was required to testify in court. Her counsel ensured in advance that the judge 
presiding over the case would be a woman. The counsel was screened from the Muslim 
woman’s view by a large umbrella and the courtroom was guarded to ensure that other 
men did not enter during her testimony. In this manner, the woman was able to testify 
without the veil.46   
                                                 
43 Equal Treatment Advisory Committee (ETAC) of the Judicial Studies Board (JSB), available from: 
http://www.jsboard.co.uk/downloads/etbb/2009_etbb_3_religon.pdf (last visited June 10 2010). Chapter 3.3 
Religious Dress, 3-18/1. 
44 JSB, at 3-18/4   
45 JSB, 3-18/6. 
46 Caroline Bridge, “Case Reports: Practice: Evidence,” Family Law 37 (2007): 986.  
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Tolerance, sensitivity and pragmatism are not inherently inconsistent with the 
popular US emphasis on judges having control over their courtrooms. Judges should have 
substantial control over their courtrooms, including the power to ban clothing or nudity 
that disrupts, demeans or trivializes the forum of justice.47 Judges can exercise control 
and yet be highly tolerant of person’s style and religious preferences. A New Jersey judge 
was reversed when he held a female attorney in contempt of court for wearing slacks and 
a sweater in court.48 In the American northeast, slacks and a sweater are less formal 
professional attire than a black suit and tie. But, unlike Mickey Mouse ears, a Batman 
costume, a comically oversized sombrero, a pants and sweater outfit does not demean, 
trivialize or disrupt a courtroom.   
Women of Muslim faith wearing the niqab are neither disruptive nor an affront. 
They have a right not to be observed, so long as they can be seen, heard and identified in 
other straightforward and appropriate available ways.49 As a constitutional matter, respect 
for religious freedom demands that there should be a very strong presumption against 
religious clothing bans and a strict requirement of accommodation in those instances in 
which the state asserts a truly compelling interest in undressing its people. U.S. courts 
should avoid the quick conclusion that the niqab is “a true obstacle to the judicial task.” 
 
 
                                                 
47 State v. Allen, 113 Ore. App. 306, 308 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). 
48 In re De Carlo, 357 A.2d 273, 275 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
49 Aaron J. Williams, “The Veiled Truth: Can the Credibility of Testimony Given by a Niqab-Wearing 
Witness be Judged Without the Assistance of Facial Expressions?,” University of Detroit Mercy Law 
Review 85 (2008):  273.  
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The Wider Constitutional Context 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed restrictions on Muslim 
headscarves or facial veils. In the past, the Court has upheld laws aimed at compelling 
religious minorities to conform to a variety of majority practices. The Court’s stance has 
been that “[w]e have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from 
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the state is free to 
regulate.”50 In Kelly v. Johnson (1976), the Court identified law enforcement as a realm 
of public service in which the state may dictate uniform dress and hairstyles.51 In 
Goldman v. Weinberger,52 the Court upheld military policies limiting the right of an 
active duty Jewish rabbi and clinical psychologist to wear the yarmulke. However, the 
weight of the Courts’ decisions point to recognition of a constitutional right of minority 
group members to wear distinctive religiously inspired garb as free exercise of belief, and 
to a strong presumption that they may do so in the courtroom and courthouse.  
In the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, Cohen v. California (1971), the Court 
threw out the disorderly conduct conviction of a California man who donned a jacket 
bearing the offensive words “F--k the Draft” in a court house corridor.53 The decision 
was not unanimous, but the majority stressed that the First Amendment is not obliterated 
simply because a man uses a single crude expletive to express his political position on 
military conscription. The Cohen decision rested on the requirements of freedom of 
expression protected by the First Amendment. The First Amendment also protects the 
                                                 
50 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
51 Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). 
52 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
53 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).    
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free exercise of religion. If the first Amendment protects tasteless jackets, it could be 
expected to protect tasteful modesty attire worn for religious purposes.  
To an extent government may restrict attire and even hairstyles, consistent with 
the First Amendment. But the Court has never been understood to endorse blanket 
disregard for religious attire in the name of conformity. Thus in 2005 the U.S. Office of 
Civil Rights announced plans to intervene on behalf of a Muslim girl suspended from 
school for wearing a headscarf. The Benjamin Franklin Science Academy had suspended 
an 11-year-old Muslim, Nashala Tallah Hearn. The girl had refused to remove her hijab 
headscarf in class. A school dress code forbade wearing hats, bandanas and other head 
coverings in the classroom. Muslim civil rights groups and the U.S. Justice Department 
Office of Civil Rights criticized the suspension, which was soon lifted.    
The 2009 Supreme Court’s decision in Safford Unified School District v. 
Redding,54 underscores the obligation of the state to recognize and respect female 
modesty. The case held that public school administrators violated a middle school girl’s 
Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless search and seizure when they conducted a 
strip search to look for contraband ibuprofen. Prior to Redding, the Court had held that a 
“special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement permits public 
schools to conduct non law-enforcement searches of children and youth in public schools 
to check for illegal drug use or possession of contraband. But with the Redding decision, 
the court recognized modesty as a limit of privacy on school’s right to conduct bodily 
searches of youngsters. Redding was not the first time the Court acknowledged the 
importance of modesty. The first acknowledgment came in Union Pacific Railroad v. 
                                                 
54  Safford Unified School District v. Redding, 557 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). 
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Botsford, 55 Citing the importance of modesty and privacy, the case had held that a 
woman who filed a tort action alleging physical injuries need not submit to a medical 
examination at the request of the defendant. The notion that tort plaintiffs need not 
undergo a professional medical examination is now obsolete, but the notion that women 
have a “right to be let alone” that permits them to keep themselves covered in public lives 
on. The privacy sentiment advanced in the Botsford case has been enduring: “No right is 
held more sacred, or more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from restraint or 
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”56  
Some U.S. judges are persuaded that hijab is protected free exercise. Accordingly, 
in 2007 a woman in Galveston, Texas was awarded $17,250, after she alleged that a 
security guard refused to allow her to enter the courtroom unless she removed her 
headscarf “worn in observance of hijab.” 57 Her case led to official measures to remind 
local “judges to be sensitive to the constitutional rights of people in the courtroom and 
specifically noting that people who wear their religious clothing or head wear are not 
required to remove [it] upon entering the courtroom.”58 The religious Free Exercise 
clause of the First Amendment must surely require toleration of the modesty garments of 
Muslim women. But hijab, which leaves a woman’s face fully observable is not niqab, 
which leaves only a woman’s eyes in view. Is the difference constitutionally relevant?  
 
                                                 
55  Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). 
56 Id. at 251.  
57 Boyd v. Texas, 301 Fed. App'x 363, 364-65 (5th Cir. 2008).  
58 Ibid.  
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A “Compelling State Interest” 
Because religious free exercise is a fundamental constitutional liberty, and a 
liberty protected by religious freedom restoration statutes, the central question that must 
be addressed is whether the state has a compelling interest that warrants excluding niqab 
from the court room. Five main concerns—veracity, accountability, demeanor, identity 
and fairness—have prompted courts to seek to exclude face-veiled women as parties and 
witnesses.  
 Government has a compelling interest in a judicial system governed by rules and 
procedures that enable those responsible for fact-finding—judges, lawyers, prosecutors 
and juries—to assess the veracity of witnesses and parties. The government also has a 
compelling interest in holding accusers accountable for the statements they make and 
serious allegations of wrong-doing the levy against others. As for veracity and 
accountability, niqab interferes with the obligation to confront those whom one has 
accused. Facing a niqab-draped woman satisfies the desire to look a person in the eye to 
compel accountability and thereby to assess veracity; but frustrates the ability to ascertain 
veracity on the evidence of overall facial expression and body language.  
Demeanor is evidence of truthfulness and also of mental and emotional fitness to 
stand trial. Demeanor is evidence of character and of whether a person is making a 
serious effort to pay attention and show respect to others in court. Government has a 
compelling interest in a judicial system in which participants act with rationality, civility 
and seriousness. The sight of niqab-drapped women, invites inferences of femininity, 
modesty and religiosity; but blocks inferences of immaturity, indifference, anger, 
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boredom or contempt. Behind her veil the Muslim party or witness might be sticking out 
her tongue, yawning, dozing, pursing or biting her lips, smirking, grinning or frowning.  
While it may be easier to judge the veracity and demeanor of a person who is not 
wearing a veil than to judge the veracity and demeanor of a person who is, judges, 
lawyers and juries nevertheless have significant bases for judgment. They can rely upon 
assessments of the veiled woman's tone of voice, choice of words, and the consistency 
and plausibility of her statements. They can judge the woman based on the look and 
movement of her eyes, her carriage, her gait, her posture, the manner in which she uses 
her hands. The assessment of demeanor does not depend upon seeing the face or entire 
face of the speaker. In fact, “[a]ccording to the empirical evidence, ordinary people 
cannot make effective use of demeanor in deciding whether to believe a witness. On the 
contrary, there is some evidence that the observation of demeanor diminishes rather than 
enhances the accuracy of credibility judgments.”59 In Morales v. Artuz, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the defendant’s right to confront a witness 
was violated when the key witness testified wearing sunglasses so “dark… that you can’t 
see through them.”60 The court held that the jury was still able to observe the witness’s 
delivery, nervousness, and body language. The court explained that it was more 
important that the jury was able to triangulate the observed demeanors with the substance 
of the testimony, the witness’s opportunity to observe, the consistency of the testimony, 
and whether the witness had any hostile motive. It could be argued that the right to 
confront one’s accusers goes to core public values and undercuts the right to veil. But that 
right to confront accusers cannot be interpreted as a right to force a person who is 
                                                 
59 Olin Guy Wellborn III, “Demeanor,” Cornell Law Review 76 (1991): 1075.  
60 Morales v. Artuz, 281 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2002).  
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completely willing to appear in a courtroom and questioned, to take of attire called for by 
her faith. The wearing of the niqab is a kind of personal religious conduct that courts 
must tolerate and accommodate.   
As for identity, it is easy to verify the identity of a person whose full face is in 
plain view, but the female form behind the niqab could be almost anyone of similar 
weight, height and color. There are plenty of ways a judge or other court personnel can 
identify a woman short of asking her to appear for the duration of a trial unveiled. The 
guidelines of the Maryland state Attorney General for meeting the identification needs of 
Maryland courts call for asking a woman wearing a modesty veil to momentarily remove 
it in the presence of a female security officer.61  
In 2005 a New Zealand judge ruled that two Muslim witnesses testifying for the 
prosecution in a criminal procedure could not testify while wearing a burqa.62 This case 
presented two difficulties. First, the burqa not only covers the face but the whole body; 
thus, the witnesses’ body language would be difficult to assess beneath the burqa. 
Second, in a criminal case such as this one, testimony is more crucial than in a civil 
procedure. Namely, criminal cases depart from the relations between two parties and 
become a matter of public interest. The public has the right to a transparent and open 
criminal justice system and has an interest in the conviction of criminals. On the other 
hand, part of the defendant’s right to fair trial should allow him to cross-examine 
                                                 
61 Office of the Attorney General, State of Maryland, May 27, 2009, “Constitutional Law- Free Exercise 
Clause—Whether Deputy Sheriff May Require An Individual Entering A Courthouse To Remove A 
Religious Face Covering For Security Purposes." 94 Md. Op. Atty. Gen. 81, 2009 WL 1648560 (Md.A.G.). 
Available from: http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/2009/94oag81.pdf (last visited 10 June 2010).  
62 Police v. Razamjoo [2005] DCR 408 (District Court, Auckland). 
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witnesses whose faces are uncovered. The judge in this case ruled that the court and 
litigants should be able to see the faces of witnesses. Otherwise, the court stated, how 
could they know “that the person re-entering the witness box today is the same person 
who was there yesterday?” The court added that even with visual identification it is 
difficult to distinguish between people of similar build and facial characteristics. The 
court emphasized the significance of watching witnesses’ faces while they are under 
cross-examination and the public’s right to observe justice unfolding in the courts. 
Nevertheless, the court allowed for some accommodations for the witnesses. The court 
ruled that screens would be used to ensure that only the judge and counsel would see the 
witnesses’ faces while they testified and that the court’s staff would be comprised 
entirely of women. The court also ordered that steps be taken to ensure that the witnesses 
would not be seen unveiled in the entrance to the courtroom or when they departed. The 
court specifically mentioned that the witnesses were allowed to express their religious 
views by wearing a hat or scarf that covered their hair.          
Finally, as for bias, the niqab will seem extreme and exotic to some judges, jurors, 
parties, witnesses, attorneys prosecutors and courthouse personnel. Ethnic prejudice and 
unfair bias may be amplified by the appearance of veiled women in a US court room.   
The Constitution will not allow a blanket niqab removal policy based either on 
the need to judge demeanor or veracity, to identify, to compel accountability, or to 
identify and avert bias. If the state’s interest in all of these is compelling, it may interfere 
with religious free exercise but must do so in the least restrictive manner.  
